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Asylum law was enacted in the United States as a social policy to
assist and protect deserving international refugees. In a recent decision,
Matter of A-R-C-G-, the Board of Immigration Appeals acknowledged
for the first time in a precedential decision that at least some domestic
violence victims are eligible for asylum relief through "particular social
group" constructions. The Board held that "married women in
Guatemala who are unable to leave their relationships" constitute a
"particular social group" within the meaning of the Immigration and
Nationality Act. Through this decision, the Board recognized a narrowly
defined social group claim brought by a domestic violence victim.
However, the precedential value of Matter ofA-R-C-G- causes confusion
in its practical application, as the boundaries for a cognizable social
group relating to domestic violence are not defined in the decision.
This Comment first explores the evolving legislative and
administrative history of "particular social group" requirements within
asylum law, specifically with respect to domestic violence-related
claims. In addition, this Comment explores the various interpretations of
Matter of A-R-C-G-'s precedential value. This Comment then evaluates
the adequacy of alternative forms of immigration relief for domestic
violence victims already present within the United States. Finally, this
Comment will recommend that adjudicators should broadly interpret
Matter ofA-R-C-G-'s precedential value when analyzing future domestic
violence-related social group claims to include victims of various
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nationalities, genders, marital statuses, and similar domestic abuse
situations.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In a recent precedential decision, Matter ofA-R-C-G-,' the Board of
Immigration Appeals ("Board")2 held that "married women in Guatemala
who are unable to leave their relationships" constitute a "particular social
group" within the meaning of the Immigration and Nationality Act ("the
Act").3 Through this decision, the Board embraced a narrowly defined
"particular social group" claim brought by a domestic violence victim for
the first time.4 The Board, however, failed to define the boundaries of
the decision and questions remain unanswered as to which individuals
with what types of experiences will qualify for relief.' Although Matter
1. Matter of A-R-C-G-, 26I. & N. Dec. 388 (B.I.A. 2014).
2. See infra note 19.
3. Matter ofA-R-C-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 388-89; Immigration and Nationality Act
§ 208, 8 U.S.C. § 1158 (2012) (providing the asylum provision).
4. See Julia Preston, In First for Court, Woman is Ruled Eligible for Asylum in U.S.
on Basis of Domestic Abuse, N.Y. TIMEs (Aug. 29, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/
2014/08/30/us/victim-of-domestic-violence-in-guatemala-is-ruled-eligible-for-asylum-in-
us.html?emc=edit tnt_20140830 &nlid=69662781&tntemail0=y&_r-2.
5. Recent Adjudication: Asylum Law - Membership in a Particular Social Group -
Board of Immigration Appeals Holds that Guatemalan Woman Fleeing Domestic
Violence Meets the Threshold Asylum Requirement, 128 HARv. L. REv. 2090, 2090-97
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of A-R-C-G- altered. the scope of asylum law by concluding that some
international domestic violence victims are eligible for asylum relief
under "particular social group" constructions, the case has uncertain
precedential value regarding the type of domestic violence-related victim
that is eligible for relief.6
Given the importance of this decision to international domestic
violence victims, Matter of A-R-C-G-'s precedential value should be
broadly interpreted in future domestic violence-related social group
decisions. Specifically, the Board should expand its recognition of social
groups relating to domestic violence beyond the facts of Matter of A-R-
C-G- to include victims of other nationalities, genders, marital statuses,
and similar domestic abuse situations if they can meet the high burden of
proof required.7
Part I of this Comment explores the evolving legislative and
administrative history of "particular social group" requirements within
asylum law, specifically with respect to domestic violence-related
claims.8 Part II of this Comment examines the various interpretations of
Matter of A-R-C-G-'s uncertain precedential value.9 Part III of this
Comment evaluates the inadequacy of alternative forms of immigration
relief for international domestic violence victims provided by United
States immigration law.10 Finally, Part IV of this Comment recommends
that adjudicators should broadly interpret the Board's decision in Matter
ofA-R-C-G- as encompassing claims by future domestic violence victims
of other nationalities, genders, marital statuses, and involving similar
domestic abuse situations.
II. BACKGROUND
A. A BrieffHistory ofAsylum Law and Refugee Status
Asylum law was enacted in the United States as a social policy to
assist deserving international refugees.12  The international refugee
protection regime began after World War II when government
representatives drafted the 1951 United Nations Convention Relating to
(2015) (hereinafter Recent Adjudication); see Matter of A-R-C-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. at
388-96.
6. Recent Adjudication, supra note 5, at 2097.
7. See infra note 162.
8. See infra Part ILA, IIB, I.C.
9. See infra Part III.A.
10. See infra Part III.B.
11. See infra Part III.C.
12. Karen Musalo, Personal Violence, Public Matter: Evolving Standards in
Gender-Based Asylum Law, in 36(2) HARv. INT'L REv. (2015), http://hir.harvard.edu/
personal-violence-public-matter-evolving-standards-in-gender-based-asylum-law/.
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the Status of Refugees1 3 and the 1967 United Nations Protocol Relating
to the Status of Refugees ("Protocol").14 The Protocol defined the term
"refugee" as an individual with a "well-founded fear of being persecuted
for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular
social group[,] or political opinion." 5 The United States, a party to the
Protocol,16  has ratified and adopted (with slight variation) the
international refugee definition in its domestic legislation.17 Specifically,
the Act's phrase "membership in a particular social group" originated in
the internationally accepted Refugee Convention and Protocol.8
Recently, the Board of Immigration Appeals19 approved a narrowly
defined domestic violence-related asylum claim for relief.20 However,
statutory asylum law does not explicitly include domestic violence-based
21claims within its scope. In order to circumvent a denial of an asylum
request based on a domestic violence claim, an applicant may propose a
"particular social group" of related individuals similarly situated that
have been subject to domestic violence.22 The applicant must prove that
the proposed social group is: (1) comprised of individual members who
share a common immutable characteristic; (2) defined with particularity;
13. U.N. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees art. 1(A)(2), July 28, 1951,
189 U.N.T.S. 150.
14. U.N. Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, Jan. 31, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 6223,
606 U.N.T.S. 267. Article 1 contains the refugee definition. Id.
15. Musalo, supra note 12.
16. INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 452 n.21 (1987) ("Although the United
States has never been a party to the 1951 Convention, it is a party to the Protocol, which
incorporates the Convention's definition in relevant part.").
17. See Musalo, supra note 12; Developments in the Law Immigration - Policy and
the Rights ofAliens, 96 HARv. L. REV. 1286, 1352-53 (1983) (noting the Refugee Act of
1980 was enacted by Congress due to the continuing "plight of refugees" and expanding
on the definition of "refugee").
18. See Matter of Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 232 (B.I.A. 1985); see also 8 U.S.C.
§ 1158 (2012).
19. The Board is an administrative body within the Department of Justice that is
responsible for reviewing U.S. immigration court decisions. CHARLES GORDON ET AL.,
IMMIGRATION LAW AND PROCEDURE § 3.05 (Matthew Bender rev. ed., 2015) (describing
that after Congress transferred the administration of immigration to the Department of
Justice in 1940, the Board of Immigration Appeals "was given the power to make final
decisions, subject only to possible review by the Attorney General"); Stephen H.
Legomsky, Forum Choices for Review of Agency Adjudication: A Study of the
Immigration Process, 71 IOWA L. REV. 1297, 1307 (1986) (explaining that the Board is
now located within the Department of Justice's Executive Office for Immigration Review
which decides cases based on the administrative record and selects certain precedential
decisions for publication that bind immigration judges and the Department of Homeland
Security).
20. See generally Matter of A-R-C-G-, 26 1. & N. Dec. 388 (B.I.A. 2014).
21. See 8 U.S.C. § 1158 (2012).
22. See id.
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and (3) socially distinct within the society in question.23 Victims of
domestic violence may then attempt to qualify for asylum relief and
protection under the enumerated "particular social group" avenue
24
provided within the Act's statutory language.
The following decisions by the Board interpreting the statutory term
"particular social group" indicate that asylum law is expanding and
witnessing greater acceptance of various asylum claims through this
enumerated ground.25 Most recently, this trend was depicted through the
Board's interpretation of social group requirements with respect to
domestic violence-related claims in Matter of A-R-C-G-.26 In order to
understand the Board's current position, it is important to understand the
evolution of Board decisions contributing to the development of the
current "particular social group" requirements that a domestic violence
victim must demonstrate in order to be eligible for asylum relief.
1. Matter of Acosta
First, in Matter ofAcosta,27 the Board began the task of interpreting
and clarifying the meaning of the term "particular social group" pursuant
to statutory asylum law.28 The Board indicated that an asylum applicant
bears the burden of proof and the burden of persuasion in requests for
relief by a preponderance of the evidence.2 9 In order to establish
eligibility for asylum relief, the applicant must satisfy the elements of the
definition of "refugee" as provided in the Act.30 The refugee provision
requires that the applicant: (a) have a fear of persecution, (b) prove that
23. See Matter ofAcosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 233; see also Matter of W-G-R-, 26 1. &
N. Dec. 208, 213, 216 (B.I.A. 2014).
24. See generally 8 U.S.C. § 1158 (2012) (providing the authority for any noncitizen
to apply for asylum while physically present in the United States).
25. See generally Matter of A-R-C-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 388 (B.I.A. 2014); Matter of
W-G-R-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 208; Matter of M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 227 (B.I.A. 2014);
Matter of R-A-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 906 (B.I.A. 1999) (en banc), vacated, 22 I. & N. Dec.
906 (A.G. 2001), remanded, 23 I. & N. Dec. 694 (A.G. 2005), remanded and stay hlfted,
24 I. & N. Dec. 629 (A.G. 2008); Matter of Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211 (discussing
Board decisions that interpret the meaning of "particular social group").
26. Matter ofA-R-C-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 388-96.
27. Matter of Acosta, 19 1. & N. Dec. 211 (B.I.A. 1985).
28. Id. at 211-37.
29. Id. at 215; 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B) (2012) (defining the burden of proof).
30. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A) (2012) (defining "refugee"); see also Matter of
Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 213. A "refugee" is "any person who is outside any country of
such person's nationality ... and who is unable or unwilling to return to, and is unable
and unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protection of, that country because of
persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality,
membership in a particular social group, or political opinion . . . 8 U.S.C. §
1101(a)(42)(A) (2012).
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the fear is "well-founded,"3' (c) persuade the court that the persecution
feared is "on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a
particular social group, or political opinion,"32 and (d) be unwilling to
return to his or her home country or country of last habitual residence
due to a well-founded fear of persecution. Specifically, the Board
reasoned that an applicant may qualify as a refugee when there is
evidence presented that the persecution was directed at the applicant
because of his or her membership in a group of persons sharing a
common immutable characteristic.3 4
Even though the Board did not precisely address domestic violence-
related social group claims in this decision, Matter of Acosta began the
trend of interpreting the meaning of the ambiguous statutory term
"particular social group."3 The Board took a broad approach when
interpreting this term, as illustrated by their decision that an immutable
trait must be, a characteristic that is "fundamental to [] individual
identities [of group members]."3 This reading of the immutability
requirement allowed domestic violence victims seeking asylum relief to
take advantage of social group formulations based on characteristics
beyond the traditional immutable traits provided in the statute.37
2. Matter of R-A-
Over ten years later, in Matter of R-A-,38 the Board determined for
the first time that victims of domestic violence could establish
31. See Matter of Mogharrabi, 19 I. & N. Dec. 439, 446 (B.I.A. 1987) (finding that
the applicant must establish he or she "possesses a belief or characteristic the persecutor
wants to overcome," the persecutor is aware, or could become aware, that he or she
possesses this belief or characteristic, and the persecutor has the "capability of punishing"
and the "inclination to punish" the applicant).
32. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(i) (2012) ("To establish that the applicant is a refugee
within the meaning of [section 1101(a)(42)(A)], the applicant must establish that race,
religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion was or
will be at least one central reason for persecuting the applicant.").
33. 8 U.S.C. § 1 101(a)(42)(A) (2012); Matter ofAcosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 219.
34. See Matter of Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 233 (defining "common immutable
characteristic" as a characteristic that is beyond the power of the members of the group to
change or is so fundamental to their identities that it should not be required to change).
35. Id.
36. Id. ("The shared characteristic might be an innate one such as sex, color, or
kinship ties, or in some circumstances it might be a shared past experience such as former
military leadership or land ownership.").
37. Id. at 231; see also 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(i) (2012) (listing the protected
grounds for refugee status).
38. Matter of R-A-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 906 (B.I.A. 1999) (en banc), vacated, 22 I. & N.
Dec. 906 (AG 2001), remanded, 23 I. & N. Dec. 694 (A.G. 2005), remanded and stay
lfted, 24 I. & N. Dec. 629 (A.G. 2008).
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membership in a particular social group for purposes of asylum relief.
39
However, the Board also restricted this interpretation by providing that
the social group could not be constructed solely upon the members'
domestic abuse.40
Matter ofR-A- concerned the asylum application of Ms. Alvarado, a
native and citizen of Guatemala.41 From the start of her young marriage,
Ms. Alvarado's husband subjected her to violent physical and sexual
abuse.42 Almost daily, her husband would rape and forcibly sodomize
her, while on numerous occasions beating her into unconsciousness.
4 3
When Ms. Alvarado called for police assistance, the police failed to
respond.44 When she appeared before a Guatemalan judge, she was
informed that the law "would not interfere in domestic disputes."
45 With
no legal means of recourse or protection, Ms. Alvarado escaped to her
family members' homes in Guatemala and tried fleeing Guatemala City
with her children, but her husband always found her.46 With assistance,
Ms. Alvarado finally fled Guatemala without her children and applied for
asylum in the United States under the proposed social group of
"Guatemalan women who have been involved intimately with
Guatemalan male companions, who believe that women are to live under
male domination."47
In evaluating whether Ms. Alvarado's social group claim was
cognizable, the Board announced that an applicant must show how the
chosen immutable characteristic is "understood in the [applicant's]
society," such that persecutors would identify the group members as
"warranting suppression or infliction of harm."48 Further, the Board
indicated that the proposed group must be understood in the specific
society as a faction or recognized part of the population.
4 9 The Board
suggested that Ms. Alvarado failed to demonstrate that victims of spousal
abuse viewed themselves as members of the proposed group.o In
39. Id. at 917.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 908; see generally Domestic Violence-Based Asylum Claims: CGRS
Practice Advisory, CTR. FOR GENDER & REFUGEE STUDIEs 3 (Sept. 12, 2014),
https://pennstatelaw.psu. edu/sites/default/files/documents/pdfs/Domestic%20Violence-
Based%20Asylum%20Claims%20(Sept%
2 012,%202014).pdf (hereinafter Practice
Advisory).
42. Matter ofR-A-, 22 I. & N. Dec. at 908.




47. Id. at 909, 911.




5 PENN STATE LAW REVIEW
addition, the Board found that Ms. Alvarado failed to establish the
victims' spouses were motivated to inflict harm based on the victims'
membership in the group.51  Because the Board determined that an
applicant must establish both a common immutable trait and "social
visibility" 52 to form a particular social group, and Ms. Alvarado did not
prove either of those elements, the Board concluded that Ms. Alvarado's
claim did not warrant asylum relief.53
Regarding the social visibility requirement in the domestic violence
context, the Board noted that an applicant must prove the prominence of
spousal abuse within the society in question.54 Despite the spousal abuse
suffered by Ms. Alvarado and other Guatemalan women, the Board
reasoned that Ms. Alvarado failed to prove that spousal abuse was a
common and recognized societal attribute in Guatemala.55  Thus, the
Board determined that "the mere existence of shared descriptive
characteristics is insufficient to qualify those possessing the common
characteristics as members of a particular social group."56
In sum, the Board held that even if Ms. Alvarado's proposed social
group was cognizable, she did not establish that her husband harmed her
"on account of' her membership in such a group.7 Although Ms.
Alvarado was unsuccessful with her asylum application before the
Board, the Attorney General remanded her case on appeal.58  The
Attorney General's discretionary act ordered the Board to revisit
domestic violence-related asylum claims and encouraged the production
of a uniform standard.59  Though Matter of R-A- lacked precedential
value60 for domestic violence victims to base future social group claims,
this decision was not the end for domestic violence-related social group
51. Id. at 918-19.
52. This concept will be discussed more fully in the next paragraph.
53. See Matter ofR-A-, 22 I. & N. Dec. at 927 ("We are not persuaded that the abuse
occurred because of her membership in a particular social group or because of an actual
or imputed political opinion.").
54. Id. at 919.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 920.
58. See Matter of R-A-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 629, 632 (A.G. 2008).
59. See id. at 631-32 (remanding to the Board for reconsideration of the issues
presented with respect to asylum claims based on domestic violence).
60. See Practice Advisory, supra note 41, at 4-5 ("[I]n December 2009, after
enduring more than a decade of legal limbo, Ms. Alvarado was granted asylum. Because
the grant was by [the Department of Homeland Security's] stipulation, there is no
extensive [immigration judge] decision; the judge's order, which is less than a sentence
long, simply refers to the agreement of the parties. Because the R-A- case had become
the battleground on which the issue of domestic violence as a basis for asylum had been
fought for more than a decade, the victory had great symbolic significance. However, it
has no binding precedential value.").
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cases. Before reaching the Board's recent precedential domestic
violence-related decision, it is important to fully understand the
"particular social group" requirements discussed in Matter ofR-A-.
B. "Particular Social Group" Requirements
1. Social Distinction and Particularity1
In Matter of W-G-R-62 and Matter of M-E-V-G-, 63 the Board further
unpacked the particular social group requirements of "social distinction"
and "particularity," which asylum applicants must satisfy in order to
qualify for relief.64 In Matter of W-G-R-, the Board noted its continued
deference to its immutability standard provided in Matter of Acosta and
to the Act, which defines the prerequisite elements for an applicant to
obtain refugee status.65 The Board, however, clarified its interpretation
of the term "particular social group" by holding that particularity and
social distinction are also prerequisites for constructing a cognizable
social group claim.6 6
Adjudicators of social group cases often encountered confusion and
differing understandings of how the Board interpreted the social
distinction, formerly known as social visibility, requirement.
67  This
requirement exemplifies the importance of society's perception or
recognition of a particular social group.8 However, the term "social
visibility" implied an ocular view of a social group, which the Board
indicated was not its intention.6 9  Thus, the Board renamed the term
61. Although the following decisions involve different forms of persecution, they are
important in understanding domestic violence-related asylum claims because they further
clarify the social distinction and particularity standards.
62. Matter of W-G-R-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 208 (B.I.A. 2014) (discussing former gang
members who renounced gang membership).
63. Matter of M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 227 (B.I.A. 2014) (discussing young
people who resisted gang membership).
64. Matter of W-G-R-, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 208-226; Matter of M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N.
Dec. at 227-253. The social distinction requirement was formerly known as "social
visibility." See Matter of W-G-R-, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 211.
65. Matter of W-G-R-, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 212; see generally Matter of Acosta, 19 I.
& N. Dec. 211 (B.I.A. 1985) (providing the immutability standard); 8 U.S.C. §
11 01(a)(42) (2012) (defining "refugee").
66. Matter of W-G-R-, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 212.
67. Id. at 211 (citing Umafia-Ramos v. Holder, 724 F.3d 667, 672-73 (6th Cir. 2013)
and Henriquez-Rivas v. Holder, 707 F.3d 1081, 1087 (9th Cir. 2013) as examples).
68. Id. at 216.
69. Id. ("[Slocial visibility does not mean 'ocular' visibility-either of the group as a
whole or of individuals within the group-any more than a person holding a protected
religious or political belief must be 'ocularly' visible to others in society.").
5632016]
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"social distinction" to avoid further confusion in the adjudication of
social group cases.70
Despite this clarification, a central question remained regarding the
Board's interpretation of a related term-"perception."71  The Board
reasoned in Matter of W-G-R- that to be perceived as a social group, the
society in question does not necessarily need to be able to identify
individual group members, but the common immutable trait must be such
that defines the group within the society.72 The Board also explicitly
rejected any finding of social distinction based on a persecutor's
perception.73 As a result, this element has a significant impact on a
domestic violence victim's ability to establish a particular social group,
especially if the victim's society does not recognize or identify their
membership in the proposed social group because the common
immutable trait is non-physical.74
To further clarify the elements necessary to establish a social group,
Matter of M-E- V-G- sought to illuminate the continued overlap between
the social distinction and particularity requirements.5 Courts, and the
Board itself, have improperly blended these two elements in past
decisions, despite the fact that these elements serve very different roles in
particular social group construction.76
In an attempt to dissect the differences between particularity and
social distinction, Matter of M-E- V-G- noted several decisions where
proposed social groups were defined with particularity, but would not be
considered socially distinct within a literal, ocular interpretation of the
requirement.77  Groups that have been accepted by the Board as
cognizable social groups include homosexuals targeted for their societal
status as homosexuals and young tribal women opposed to female genital
mutilation that was a common practice within their tribe.78  The
70. Id.
71. See id. at 216-17.
72. Id. at 217.
73. Id. at 216-17. With respect to domestic violence victims, the persecutor's
perception may still be relevant. See id. at 218; see also Henriquez-Rivas v. Holder, 707
F.3d 1081, 1089-90 (9th Cir. 2013) (reasoning that the perception of the persecutor is
relevant in determining the existence of a particular social group).
74. See, e.g., Matter of M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 227, 228 (B.I.A. 2014)
(discussing the resistance of gang membership); In re V-T-S-, 21 . & N. Dec. 792, 798
(B.I.A. 1997) (discussing Filipinos of mixed ancestry); see also Jillian Blake, Getting to
Group Under U.S. Asylum Law, 90 NOTRE DAME L. REV. ONLINE 167, 167-81 (2015).
75. Matter ofM-E-V-G-, 26I. & N. Dec. at 240-41.
76. Id.
77. Id at 238.
78. Id. at 238-39 (citing Matter of Kasinga, 21 1. & N. Dec. 357 (B.I.A. 1996)
(discussing female genital mutilation) and Matter of Toboso-Alfonso, 20 I. & N. Dec.
819 (B.I.A. 1990) (concerning homosexuals)).
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immutable characteristics at issue in these decisions are not literally
visible, yet societies can still meaningfully distinguish the groups'
members.7 9
As both Matter of W-G-R- and Matter of M-E-V-G- reveal, the
Board has recognized social distinction as a requirement for cognizable
social group formation.8 0 The Board's non-ocular interpretation of this
element is valuable to domestic violence victims seeking refuge because
ocular visibility would be difficult, if not impossible, to prove if spousal
abuse is not evident from physical injuries or if these injuries have
disappeared over time.81
2. Constructing a Cognizable Social Group
As a result of the Board's decisions interpreting the statutory
asylum provision, an applicant must now establish that three different
elements exist in order to qualify for asylum relief based on his or her
membership in a "particular social group."82 An applicant must prove
that the proposed social group is: (1) comprised of individual members
who share a common immutable characteristic; (2) defined with
particularity; and (3) socially distinct within the society in question.
8 3
First, regarding the common immutable characteristic
requirement,84 this characteristic must be something that defines the
social group, and the group either cannot change it or should not be
required to change it to avoid persecution.
85  Second, regarding the
particularity requirement, the proposed group must be "sufficiently
distinct" such that it provides a clear standard for determining who falls
within the group.6 Many asylum applicants fail to adequately establish
this element because not every immutable characteristic is sufficiently
precise to define a social group within the applicant's community.
Third, regarding the social distinction requirement, the proposed group
79. See generally Matter of Kasinga, 21 1. & N. Dec. 357 (B.I.A. 1996); Matter of
Toboso-Alfonso, 20 1. & N. Dec. 819 (B.I.A. 1990).
80. But see Practice Advisory, supra note 41, at 13 (noting the Third and Seventh
Circuits continue to follow the Acosta immutability standard only).
81. Matter of W-G-R-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 208, 211 (B.I.A. 2014); Matter ofM-E-V-G-,
26 I. & N. Dec. at 228.
82. See generally Matter of W-G-R-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 208 (B.I.A. 2014); Matter of
M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 227 (B.I.A. 2014); Matter of Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211
(B.I.A. 1985) (explaining particular social group precedential Board decisions).
83. See Matter of W-G-R-, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 213, 216; see also Matter ofAcosta, 19
I. & N. Dec. at 233.
84. See Matter ofAcosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 233.
85. Matter of W-G-R-, 26 . & N. Dec. at 213.
86. Id. at 210-15.
87. Matter of M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 239.
88. See Matter of W-G-R-, 26 . & N. Dec. at 216.
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must be perceived and recognized as a group by the society in question,
although not necessarily seen by society in the ocular sense of this
concept.9
Finally, for any claim regarding the existence of a particular social
group, the fact finder must evaluate the evidence presented by the
applicant in the context of the applicant's home country.90 All these
elements evolved in social group decisions outside of the domestic
violence context, but have also had an important impact on decisions
within the domestic violence context.9 1  The Board's continued
development and interpretation of these requirements provided a basis
for their recent decision recognizing a "particular social group"
constructed by a domestic violence victim. 92
C. Matter ofA-R-C-G-
In Matter of A-R-C-G-,9 3 the Board interpreted the statutory term
"particular social group" to encompass narrowly defined asylum claims
relating to domestic violence by concluding that "married women in
Guatemala who are unable to leave their relationships" constituted a
particular social group.94 In this decision, the Board delineated various
justifications for its interpretation that cognizable social groups can
embrace domestic violence-related claims.95
Under the Matter of Acosta framework, the Board recognized the
immutable characteristic of gender for the first time in the domestic
violence context.96  In addition, the Board reasoned that where the
applicant is unable to leave a marital relationship, marital status itself
might constitute an immutable characteristic depending on the facts of
the case.97 Notably, the social group at issue in this decision was not
defined solely by the fact that the applicant had suffered domestic
89. Matter ofM-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 240.
90. See Matter of A-R-C-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 388, 392 (B.I.A. 2014) (explaining that
the fact finder is typically an immigration judge).
91. See, e.g., Matter of E-A-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 591 (B.I.A. 2008); Matter of S-E-G-
24 I. & N. Dec. 579 (B.I.A. 2008); Matter of A-M-E- & J-G-U-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 69
(B.I.A. 2007); Matter of C-A-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 951 (B.I.A. 2006).
92. Matter ofA-R-C-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 388-96.
93. Matter of A-R-C-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 388 (B.I.A. 2014).
94. Id. at 388-96.
95. Id. at 392-96.
96. See id at 392; see also Matter of Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 233 (B.I.A. 1985);
Recent Adjudication, supra note 5, at 2093.
97. Matter ofA-R-C-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 392-93.
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violence, as social groups must be defined by a characteristic other than
the risk of being persecuted.98
The Board determined that the proposed social group was defined
with particularity because the traits used to establish membership in the
group were commonly accepted and widely recognized in Guatemalan
society.99 The social distinction requirement was met with evidence that
Guatemalan society makes meaningful distinctions based on the
immutable characteristic of being a married woman in a domestic
relationship that she cannot leave.00
In contrast to the proposed social group in Matter ofR-A- that failed
to meet the social distinction requirement,101 Matter of A-R-C-G-
involved a social group defined by "commonly accepted definitions
within Guatemalan society" due to "societal expectations about gender
and subordination" as well as legal constraints on victims' freedom to
leave relationships.10 2 The Board in Matter ofA-R-C-G- emphasized that
the Guatemalan police refused to interfere in a marital relationship when
the applicant sought protection.103 In addition, the applicant's evidence
revealed that Guatemala maintains a culture of "machismo and family
violence" that perpetuates violent domestic relations even though
Guatemala has enacted laws to prosecute such crimes.1 04  Thus, the
Board established that within the context of domestic violence, a finding
of social distinction turns on the facts and evidence provided in each
case. 105
In Matter of A-R-C-G-, the Board acknowledged that cases arising
out of domestic violence or spousal abuse "involve unique and discrete
98. Id. at 393 n.14 (citing Matter of W-G-R-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 208, 215 (B.I.A.
2014)).
99. Id. at 393.
100. Id.
101. As previously noted, Matter of R-A- involved the proposed social group of
"Guatemalan women who have been involved intimately with Guatemalan male
companions, who believe that women are to live under male domination." Matter of R-
A-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 906, 909, 911 (B.I.A. 1999) (en banc).
102. Compare Matter ofR-A-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 906, with Matter ofA-R-C-G-, 26 I. &
N. Dec. at 393-94 (indicating that even the Department of Homeland Security conceded
that a cognizable particular social group existed).
103. Matter ofA-R-C-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 393.
104. Id. (citing U.S. Dep't of State, Bureau of Democracy, H.R. and Lab., Country
Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2008: Guatemala (Feb. 25, 2009),
http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/2008/wha/119161.htm (determining that the
Guatemalan "police had minimal training or capacity for investigating sexual crimes or
assisting victims of sexual crimes")); see generally Allison W. Reimann, Comment, Hope
for the Future? The Asylum Claims of Women Fleeing Sexual Violence in Guatemala,
157 U. PA. L. REv. 1199 (2009).
105. Matter of A-R-C-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 394-95 (noting that the Board would
consider documented country conditions, law enforcement statistics, expert witnesses, the
applicant's past experiences, and other credible sources of information).
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issues not present in other particular social group determinations."o6
The Board recognized that in some cases involving such abuse, the
victim will be unable to escape the abuse not only due to her relationship
status, but also because her country will not protect her.' 07 Accordingly,
the main purposes and social policies behind United States asylum law
are arguably satisfied when relief is granted in narrow circumstances for
individuals requesting refugee status whose countries will not protect
them from persecution. os
In sum, the Board expanded the boundaries of prior cognizable
social groups to encompass narrowly defined claims brought by victims
of domestic violence.109 The Board extended its decision in this case to a
claim brought by a Guatemalan domestic violence victim, but did not go
beyond this concept to decide whether domestic violence-based claims
would be sufficient, or even acceptable, in a later case.1 10 Nevertheless,
it is clear that domestic violence rises to the level of persecution in
certain cases."'
III. ANALYSIS
In Matter of A-R-C-G-, the latest in a line of domestic violence-
related asylum cases,'12 the Board left room in its interpretation of
particular social groups to encompass domestic violence-related asylum
claims in situations other than the narrow facts of Matter ofA-R-C-G-.113
Significantly, the Board left open the question of whether other
international domestic violence victims may qualify for asylum relief
under similar "particular social group" constructions comprised of
different nationalities, genders, marital statuses, and domestic abuse
situations.114 By clarifying this uncertainty, the Board could
106. Id.
107. Id. at 393-94.
108. See Musalo, supra note 12.
109. Practice Advisory, supra note 41, at 6.
110. Recent Adjudication, supra note 5, at 2097 ("A-R-C-G- meaningfully moves the
law of asylum toward more consistent and expansive recognition of domestic violence-
based asylum claims."). Notably, the Board did not provide a general rule that all
domestic violence-based particular social groups are cognizable. See id. at 2095-96; see
also Matter of A-R-C-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 393-95 (stating that "even within the
domestic violence context" social distinction, particularity, and nexus will "depend on the
facts and evidence in each individual case").
111. Recent Adjudication, supra note 5, at 2097.
112. See generally Matter of R-A-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 906 (B.I.A. 1999) (en banc);
DHS's Supplemental Brief at 1-31, Matter of L-R- (B.I.A. 2009) (unpublished),
http://graphics8.nytimes.com/packages/pdf/us/20090716-asylum-brief.pdf (hereinafter
Supplemental Brief).
113. Matter of A-R-C-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 395-96; Musalo, supra note 12; Recent
Adjudication, supra note 5, at 2097.
114. Recent Adjudication, supra note 5, at 2096-97.
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conclusively open asylum relief to a greater number of domestic violence
victims worldwide.
A. Interpretations of Matter ofA-R-C-G-'s Precedential Value
In order to understand Matter ofA-R-C-G-'s precedential value, it is
important to look to the facts of the case. Matter ofA-R-C-G- involved a
noncitizen named Ms. Aminta Cifuentes and her three minor children, all
natives and citizens of Guatemala who entered the United States without
inspection in 2005.15 Once physically present within the United States,
Ms. Cifuentes filed a timely application for asylum and withholding of
removal under the Act.1 16 Ms. Cifuentes' application provided various
accounts of repugnant abuse by her spouse that she suffered throughout
her life in Guatemala.'17
Beginning at age seventeen, Ms. Cifuentes suffered both physical
and sexual abuse at the hands of her husband, including rape and weekly
beatings after she gave birth to their first child."'8 On one occasion, Ms.
Cifuentes' husband broke her nose and on another, he threw paint thinner
on her, resulting in severe bums on her breast.119
Despite numerous pleas to the Guatemalan police for assistance,
Ms. Cifuentes was told the police would not interfere in her marital
relationship.120 Without assistance from the police or the Guatemalan
government, Ms. Cifuentes resorted to finding a way to escape with her
three minor children.12 1  She repeatedly attempted to leave the
relationship and stay with her father, but each time she left, her husband
found her and threatened to kill her if she did not return to him.122 As a
result, Ms. Cifuentes left Guatemala in 2005 with her children to seek
asylum in the United States, believing that if she ever returned to her
native country, her husband would find and kill her.123
On appeal from the immigration judge's decision, the Department
of Homeland Security conceded that Ms. Cifuentes had established past
persecution on account of her membership in a "particular social group"
comprised of "married women in Guatemala who are unable to leave
their relationship." 24 Accordingly, Matter of A-R-C-G- indicates that





120. Id. This fact is similar to Ms. Alvarado's account in Matter ofR-A-. See Matter
of R-A-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 906, 908-09 (B.I.A. 1999) (en banc).
121. Recent Adjudication, supra note 5, at 2090-91.
122. Matter ofA-R-C-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 389.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 392.
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some domestic violence victims can be eligible for asylum.'25 However,
the ambiguity encompassed in this decision's holding will provide a
basis for different interpretations of the decision's application to asylum
claims and situations unlike that in Matter ofA-R-C-G-.126
If Matter ofA-R-C-G-'s holding is interpreted as limited to the facts
of the decision, domestic violence-related asylum will only be available
to applicants who can establish they are "Guatemalan women who
cannot leave their abusive relationships."2 7 Such a narrow reading
would restrict individuals of other nationalities, genders, and marital
statuses, who suffered similar forms of domestic abuse from utilizing
analogous social group constructions to support their claims for asylum
relief in the United States.128 Advocates of this interpretation Matter of
A-R-C-G-'s holding predict that otherwise, "the numbers of foreign
women seeking asylum could soon overwhelm the system."
29
However, without an asylum opportunity for victims of domestic
violence from countries other than Guatemala, whose governments will
not protect them from abuse, it is likely that victims will be encouraged
to unlawfully enter the United States as a means of escape and
recourse.13 0 This results in a political, social, and practical dichotomy:
either read Matter of A-R-C-G- as broadening the means for domestic
violence victims to obtain lawful presence or add persecuted individuals
to the millions of undocumented migrants already illegally present within
the United States.
B. Alternative Forms oflmmigration Relieffor Domestic Violence
Victims Present in the United States
In order to understand the importance of reading Matter of A-R-C-
G- as providing a broad basis for domestic violence victims to establish
cognizable asylum claims, it is necessary to unpack the reasons why
other forms of immigration relief for domestic violence victims are
insufficient or inapplicable. Other potential remedies for domestic
125. Recent Adjudication, supra note 5, at 2097.
126. See Matter ofA-R-C-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 392, 395 (involving married women,
located in Guatemala, who are unable to leave their abusive relationships); see also
Recent Adjudication, supra note 5, at 2097.
127. Preston, supra note 4.
128. Id. ("[T]he decision would be seized by many women whose cases are already in
court, including from other countries where domestic violence is rampant, and by women
who crossed the Southwest border recently.").
129. Id.
130. See Cindy Carcamo, Domestic violence ruling may help thousands of immigrants
get asylum, L.A. TIMES (Sept. 5, 2014), http://www.latimes.com/nation/la-na-ff-immig-
domestic-20140906-story.html (describing an asylum applicant's unlawful entry into the
United States in order to escape domestic abuse).
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violence victims physically present in the United States include, among
others, self-petitions for immigrant status under the Violence Against
Women Act ("VAWA"), 13 1 VAWA cancellation of removal as a defense
to removal proceedings,132 U-visas,13 3 the family or employment-based
immigrant preference groups, 134 humanitarian asylum,'35 withholding of
removal,136 and protection under the Convention Against Torture
("CAT"). 13 7  Still, many of these remedies will not assist individuals
when they have suffered domestic abuse outside the United States, their
abuser is not a U.S. citizen or lawful permanent resident, they are not
placed in removal proceedings, they have insufficient family ties in the
United States or employment qualifications to apply for an immigrant
visa, or the harm they suffered does not amount to torture. 138 Thus, in
some cases asylum is likely the only viable avenue for domestic violence
victims to lawfully and indefinitely remain in the United States.
First, under the VAWA, abused individuals can self-petition for
lawful permanent resident status or seek cancellation of removal if in
removal proceedings.13 9 In order to obtain relief, the individual must
meet various criteria, including a qualifying spousal relationship,
meaning the individual is married to or intended to marry an abuser who
is a U.S. citizen or lawful permanent resident.140 Yet, domestic violence
victims, such as Ms. Alvarado and Ms. Cifuentes, would be unable to
utilize the VAWA remedies if their spouses do not lawfully reside in the
United States.14 1 Therefore, these remedies do not reach a large subset of
international domestic violence victims that would likely be
encompassed under a more expansive interpretation of the Board's
-holding in Matter ofA-R-C-G-.
Pursuant to § 101(a)(1 5)(U) of the Act, those who suffer substantial
physical or mental abuse as a result of violence, including domestic
131. 8 U.S.C. § 1154(a)(1) (2012) (providing the VAWA provisions).
132. 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(2) (2012) (providing the VAWA special rule cancellation
provision).
133. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(U) (2012) (providing the U-visa provision).
134. 8 U.S.C. § 1153(a) (2012) (providing the family-based provision); 8 U.S.C. §
1153(b) (2012) (providing the employment-based provision).
135. Humanitarian Asylum Regulation, 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(1)(iii) (2016); see also
Matter ofL-S-, 25 I. & N. Dec. 705, 710 (B.I.A. 2011).
136. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(A) (2012).
137. See 8 C.F.R. §§ 1208.16, 1208.18 (2016).
138. See generally 8 U.S.C. § 1154(a)(1)(A) (2012); 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(U)
(2012); 8 U.S.C. § 1153(a) (2012); 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b) (2012); 8 C.F.R. §§ 1208.16,
1208.18 (2016).
139. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1154(a)(1), 1229b(b)(2) (2012).
140. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1154(a)(1), 1229b(b)(2)(A)(i) (2012).
141. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1154(a)(1), 1229b(b)(2) (2012); see also Matter of A-R-C-G-,
26 1. & N. Dec. 388, 389-90 (BIA. 2014); Matter of R-A-, 22 1. & N. Dec. 906, 908-10
(B.I.A. 1999) (en banc).
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violence and sexual assault, may apply for a nonimmigrant U-visa that
would confer temporary lawful status.142 However, the violence inflicted
upon the victim must occur in the United States or violate U.S. law, and
the victim must be able to provide assistance to law enforcement in the
investigation or prosecution of criminal activity. 14  As a result, victims
like Ms. Alvarado, Ms. Cifuentes, and a similar subset of international
domestic violence victims would be unable to meet the requirements
necessary to obtain this nonimmigrant visa because law enforcement
would likely lack jurisdiction to investigate or prosecute criminal activity
that occurred outside the United States.144
Domestic violence victims that have certain family members in the
United States may be able to take advantage of the family-based
preference program.145  This immigration program provides visas for
applicants who have certain family members in the United States,
including applicants who are children and siblings of U.S. citizens or
lawful permanent residents. 146 Even if a domestic violence victim
possesses a qualifying family member, the immigrant visa is still subject
to a quota, and wait times can be extraordinary depending on the
applicant's native country and priority date.147  Moreover, under the
employment-based preference program, a domestic violence victim must
possess one of the enumerated forms of employment or degrees in order
to qualify. 14 8 For either of these preference categories, the familial ties or
employment circumstances of the specific individual are crucial to
obtaining relief.149  However, many victims that suffer domestic
violence-related persecution may not have the requisite family
connections or employment history necessary for relief under these
options.
Humanitarian asylum is granted in the absence of a well-founded
fear of persecution and may be granted to an applicant who suffered past
142. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(U) (2012).
143. See id.; Victims of Criminal Activity: U Nonimmigrant Status, U.S. Citizenship
and Immigr. Services, https://www.uscis.gov/ humanitarian/victims-human-trafficking-
other-crimes/victims-criminal-activity-u-nonimmigrant-status/victims-criminal-activity-
u-nonimmigrant-status (last updated July 28, 2016).
144. See Matter ofA-R-C-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 389-40; Matter ofR-A-, 22 I. & N.
Dec. at 908-10.
145. See 8 U.S.C. § 1153(a) (2012).
146. Id.
147. Visa Bulletin For February 2016, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE BUREAU OF CONSULAR
AFFAIRS, https://travel.state.gov/content/visas/en/law-and-policy/bulletin/2016/visa-bull
etin-for-february-2016.html (last visited Oct. 28, 2016) (citing family-based immigrant
visa applicants from China, India, Mexico, and the Philippines with the longest wait
times due to the quotas or numerical caps).
148. See generally 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b) (2012).
149. See 8 U.S.C. § 1153 (2012).
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persecution when the applicant has demonstrated: (a) "compelling
reasons" for being unable to return to their home country arising out of
the severity of the past persecution, or (b) "a reasonable possibility that
he or she may suffer other serious harm upon removal to that country."150
Despite these seemingly favorable requirements for domestic violence
victims, humanitarian asylum is warranted only if the victim is first able
to successfully demonstrate past persecution on account of one of the
five protected grounds, including "membership in a particular social
group."151 The complex burden-shifting requirements of humanitarian
asylum are beyond the scope of this Comment, yet it is important to note
that in order for an asylum applicant to establish eligibility for
humanitarian asylum, the applicant must still demonstrate refugee
status.152 Therefore, like an asylum applicant, a domestic violence victim
would likely still need to establish membership in a cognizable social
group to qualify for humanitarian asylum relief.
-The withholding of removal provision provides that the Attorney
General may not remove a person to a country where his or her "life or
freedom would be threatened" because of any of the five protected
grounds.1 53 If an applicant demonstrates it is more likely than not that he
or she would be subject to persecution on account of a protected ground,
withholding of removal must be granted.154 As this burden of proof is
higher than for asylum, an applicant who fails to establish asylum
eligibility necessarily fails to establish eligibility for withholding of
removal.155  Thus, a domestic violence victim will be ineligible for
withholding of removal if he or she is unable to demonstrate membership
in a cognizable social group or a nexus between the abuse suffered and
one of the other protected grounds.'56
150. Humanitarian Asylum Regulation, 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(1)(iii) (2016); see also
Matter of L-S-, 25 I. & N. Dec. 705, 710 (B.I.A. 2011).
151. See Matter of L-S-, 25 I. & N. Dec. at 710; see also Sarah Sherman-Stokes,
Other Serious Harm: The Neglected Stepchild of Humanitarian-Asylum Law, 17-16
BENDER'S IMMIGR. BULL. 2 (2012).
152. Matter of L-S-, 25 I. & N. Dec. at 710; see 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A) (2012)
(defining "refugee").
153. See 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(A) (2012).
154. See Matter of C-T-L-, 25 I. & N. Dec. 341, 343-44, 350 (B.I.A. 2010). If an
applicant demonstrates past persecution on account of a protected ground, the applicant is
entitled to a presumption of a future threat to his or her life or freedom and the
Department of Homeland Security may rebut this presumption. See 8 C.F.R. §
1208.16(b)(1) (2016).
155. See Asylum, Withholding ofRemoval, CAT, Immigration Judge Benchbook, U.S.
Dep't of Justice, https://www.justice.gov/eoir/immigration-judge-benchbook-section-
241b (last updated Feb. 4, 2015).
156. See id.
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Under international law, if a domestic violence victim is able to
demonstrate that the harm they suffered amounted to torture, as that term
is defined in the CAT, 57 he or she may be able to establish eligibility for
protection under the CAT without showing a nexus between the harm
suffered and a protected ground. To carry his or her burden of proof for
CAT protection, a domestic violence victim must show it is more likely
than not that he or she would be tortured if removed.15 8  Thus, CAT
protection will likely only reach the fraction of domestic violence victims
who can demonstrate a clear probability that torture, such as prolonged
mental or physical harm, would occur despite efforts to avoid their
abuser in the country of removal.159
For the foregoing reasons, the provisions in the Act, including those
intended to provide relief for domestic violence victims, may not aid
individuals that would be encompassed by a broad reading of the Board's
decision in Matter ofA-R-C-G-. Accordingly, this precedential domestic
violence-related decision should be interpreted expansively to include
those victims that are not covered by other forms of immigration relief.
C. A Callfor Expanding Matter of A-R-C-G-for International
Domestic Violence Victims
1. Matter of A-R-C-G-
In order to combat the lack of relief options for domestic violence
victims who suffer abuse outside the United States, the proper
interpretation of Matter of A-R-C-G- would apply the social group
analysis in a broad sense to all nationalities, genders, marital statuses,
and other abuse situations so long as the harm inflicted rose to the level
of persecution on account of "membership in the particular social
group." 60 For example, immigration judges could utilize a broad social
group construction parallel to the one recognized by the Board in Matter
of A-R-C-G-: an individual (male or female) from a country (any
country) who was subjected to a form of qualifying domestic abuse and
157. U.N. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, and Degrading
Treatment or Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85 (defining torture in Article I
as "any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally
inflicted on a person ... when such pain or suffering inflicted by or at the instigation of
or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an
official capacity. It does not include pain or suffering arising only from, inherent in[,] or
incidental to lawful sanctions."); see 8 C.F.R. § 1208.18(a)(1) (2016).
158. See 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(c)(2) (2016).
159. See generally 8 C.F.R. § 1208.18 (2016).
160. See generally Matter of A-R-C-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 388 (B.I.A. 2014).
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was unable to leave their harmful marriage, partnership, or domestic
relationship.161
In expanding the concept of domestic violence-related social groups
beyond married Guatemalan women, the Board's decision would
encompass individuals similarly situated in other countries that have
suffered similar levels of harm and whose governments are either unable
or unwilling to protect them.16 2 With respect to domestic violence and
spousal abuse, there is no reason to believe Guatemala is unique.
163
Accordingly, the elements needed to establish a particular social group,
including particularity, social distinction, and a common immutable
characteristic, apply with equal force to other nationalities, genders,
marital statuses, and forms of domestic abuse. In fact, the Board in
Matter of A-R-C-G- indicated that marital status could itself be a
common immutable characteristic.164
Although Ms. Cifuentes was in a marital relationship with her
abuser and subsequently included the qualifier of "married" in her social
group construction,165  the Board has recently downplayed the
significance of marriage in an unpublished decision, Matter of D-M-
R-.166 In this decision the applicant was barred from seeking asylum
relief due to the one-year filing deadline, but she constructed a particular
social group of "El Salvadoran women in relationships who are unable to
leave" for withholding of removal purposes.16 7  Specifically, the
161. Seeid.at392.
162. For additional scholarship beyond the scope of this Comment discussing
expanding Matter of A-R-C-G- to domestic violence victims from countries other than
Guatemala, see Johanna K. Bachmair, Note, Asylum at Last?: Matter of A-R-C-G-'s
Impact on Domestic Violence Victims Seeking Asylum, 101 CORNELL L. REV. 1053
(2016).
163. Domestic situations in other countries, such as El Salvador, Sudan, and
Afghanistan, for example, are well documented. See U.S. Dep't of State, Bureau of
Democracy, H.R. and Lab., Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2015: El
Salvador (Apr. 13, 2016), http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/humanrightsreport/#sect
ion6women (finding violence against women to be socially acceptable); U.S. Dep't of
State, Bureau of Democracy, H.R. and Lab., Country Reports on Human Rights Practices
for 2015: Sudan (Apr. 13, 2016), http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/humanrightsreport/#
section6women (stating that the law does not specifically prohibit domestic violence);
U.S. Dep't of State, Bureau of Democracy, H.R. and Lab., Country Reports on Human
Rights Practices for 2015: Afghanistan (Apr. 13, 2016), http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/
hrrpt/humanrightsreport/#wrapper (noting targeted violence against women).
164. Matter ofA-R-C-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 392-93.
165. Id. at 389-90.
166. Matter of D-M-R-, A 095 008 524 (B.I.A. June 9, 2015); see Harvard
Immigration and Refugee Clinical Program of Harvard Law School, Designating as
Precedent the Board Decisions in D-M-R- and E-M- 1 (2015), http://legalaction
center.org/sites/default/files/docs/lac/2015%2OLitigation%20Meeting/Request%
2 0for%2
OPublication%20of/o2OD-M-R-.pdf (hereinafter Designating as Precedent)
167. Designating as Precedent, supra note 166, at 7.
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applicant based her claim on the common immutable characteristic of
being a woman who is unable to leave a domestic relationship.16 8 Unlike
Ms. Cifuentes, the applicant in Matter of D-M-R- was not married, but
was subjected to violence in a domestic relationship.169  The Board
explained in Matter of D-M-R- that its decision in Matter of A-R-C-G-
does not require an applicant seeking asylum based on domestic violence
to be married to his or her abuser, but that it will look to the
"characteristics of the relationship to determine its nature."l7 0
Despite the significance of this decision for domestic violence
victims who were not in marital relationships, the Board failed to publish
or designate Matter of D-M-R- as a precedential decision.171 Notably,
however, the Board's position in this decision regarding the
inconsequential nature of a domestic violence victim's marital status is
consistent with the Department of Homeland Security's position in its
2009 supplemental brief in Matter ofL-R-.172
As a framework for determining the boundaries of a domestic
relationship, the Department of Homeland Security cited to the definition
of "domestic relationship"1 73 in a section of the Act regarding deportation
for crimes of violence.1 74  Under the Act, individuals in cohabiting
relationships can commit crimes of domestic violence.17 ' As both the
Board and the Department of Homeland Security have recognized the
168. Designating as Precedent, supra note 166, at 7 (reasoning that the qualifiers of
"women," "domestic relationship," and "unable to leave" can be sufficiently particular in
El Salvador and that the applicant's inability to leave her relationship in the broader
context of the society in question sufficiently established persecution "on account of
membership" in a particular social group).
169. Designating as Precedent, supra note 166, at 5.
170. Designating as Precedent, supra note 166, at 7.
171. Designating as Precedent, supra note 166, at 2 (noting that the Board's holding
in D-M-R- was "principled, coherent, consistent with prior law, and provide[d] much
needed guidance").
172. Supplemental Brief, supra note 112, at 15-16 ("[The Department of Homeland
Security] believes that there are circumstances in which an applicant's status within a
domestic relationship is immutable, within the meaning of Acosta, for purposes of
particular social group analysis.").
173. See 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(E)(I) (2012) (providing that the term "crime of
domestic violence" means any crime of violence ... against a person committed by a
current or former spouse of the person, by an individual with whom the person shares a
child in common, by an individual who is cohabiting with or has cohabited with the
person as a spouse, by an individual similarly situated to a spouse of the person under the
domestic or family violence laws of the jurisdiction where the offense occurs, or by any
other individual against a person who is protected from that individual's acts under the
domestic or family violence laws of the United States or any State, Indian tribal
government, or unit of local government.").
174. Supplemental Brief, supra note 112, at 19 (citing Immigration and Nationality
Act § 237(a)(2)(E)(I), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(E)(I) (2012)).
175. Supplemental Brief, supra note 112, at 19; see 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(E)(I)
(2012) (discussing domestic relationships for deportation grounds).
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sufficiency of domestic relationships beyond marriage in domestic
violence-related social group cases, as well as defined the scope of these
relationships, Matter of A-R-C-G-'s holding should be read to
incorporate this interpretation in future decisions.176
In this regard, it is also essential for the Board to designate a
decision defining its analysis as precedential. The Board should act
quickly because a recent opinion by the Third Circuit Court of Appeals
reached an opposite interpretation that other courts may follow. On June
23, 2016, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals in Ordonez-Tevalan v.
Attorney General of the United States17 7 noted the following:
[T]here is a further reason why we must [deny Ordonez's petition for
review], in that she has not demonstrated that any alleged abuse that
she had suffered or feared resulted or would result from her
membership in a particularized social group. The IJ noted that in
Matter of A-R-C-G-, the [Board] "held that depending on the facts
and evidence in an individual case[,] ... married women in
Guatemala who are unable to leave a relationship can constitute a
cognizable social group[.]" But Ordonez is not a member of this
group, as she acknowledges that she was never married to [her
abuser].'78
After this precedential decision, it is likely that other judges may
become concerned that the legal distinction of marriage was required for
Ms. Cifuentes's victory in Matter of A-R-C-G-. Therefore, it is critical
that the Board designates as precedential their interpretation that
marriage is not required so other courts can follow it when making
decisions on this important issue.
With respect to other genders, the trend of domestic violence
throughout the world is male-on-female partner violence, even though it
is undisputed that women inflict domestic abuse against their male
partners.179 Social distinction and particularity, elements that a domestic
violence victim must prove to establish eligibility for asylum, would
likely be difficult for male victims to prove.180 For example, it may be
176. But see, e.g., Sutac v. Att'y Gen. of the U.S., No. 15-2425, 2016 U.S. App.
LEXIS 2362, at *4 (3d Cir. Jan. 26, 2016) (distinguishing the applicant's claim from the
claim in Matter of A-R-C-G- because the applicant was never legally married to her
abusive partner).
177. Ordonez-Tevalan v. Att'y Gen. of the U.S., No. 15-2187, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS
11429 (3d Cir. June 23, 2016).
178. Id. at *25 (internal citations omitted).
179. Claudia Garcia-Moreno et al., Understanding and Addressing Violence Against
Women, WORLD HEALTH ORG. 1 (2012), http://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/10665/774
3 2
/1/WHO RHR 12.36_eng.pdf (hereinafter Garcia-Moreno et al.).
180. See Caitlin Steinke, Male Asylum Applicants Who Fear Becoming the Victims of
Honor Killings: The Case for Gender Equality, 17 N.Y. CiTY L. REv. 233, 235-62
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difficult for a male victim to demonstrate that the domestic abuse he
suffered was based on his membership in a social group possessing the
immutable trait of being male, as it is unlikely many societies would
make meaningful distinctions about "being a married man in a domestic
relationship that he cannot leave."'8 1 In other words, many societies may
not recognize a male victim's inability to leave a relationship due to
traditional, male dominant gender roles.182  Where a male domestic
violence victim is unable to prove social distinction or particularity, his
claim for asylum must fail.1 8 3 Even though a broad reading may not help
many male victims, the Board's holding in Matter of A-R-C-G- leaves
room for domestic violence victims of other genders, such as transgender
or bigender,'84 to establish social groups based on the common
immutable characteristic of their gender if they can demonstrate social
distinction and particularity.
Finally, the repeated domestic abuse suffered by Ms. Cifuentes in
Matter A-R-C-G- is common among domestic violence victims.' 'In
addition to the rape and weekly beatings inflicted on Ms. Cifuentes at the
hands of her husband, it is possible that other forms of domestic abuse
could also qualify for refugee protection under the Matter of A-R-C-G-
analysis, such as severe emotional or psychological abuse.186 Although
not all forms of domestic abuse will reach the level of persecution as
defined,187 harm that amounts to "a threat to the life or freedom of, or the
infliction or suffering or harm upon"188 a domestic violence victim could
encompass a wide range of domestic abuse beyond that seen in Matter of
A-R-C-G-.
(2014) (noting that the way the form of persecution is framed "can place male applicants
at a severe disadvantage at having their . .. asylum claims recognized" and arguing that
"courts should not limit the definition of 'membership in a particular social group' to
women who are threatened").
181. Cf Matter of A-R-C-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 388, 393-94 (B.I.A. 2014).
182. Cf id.
183. See generally Matter of W-G-R-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 208 (B.I.A. 2014); Matter of
M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 227 (B.I.A. 2014).
184. However, it is also possible that transgender or bigender individuals could
construct cognizable social groups solely based on their gender in the Third and Seventh
Circuits, which continue to adopt only the Acosta immutability standard. See Practice
Advisory, supra note 41, at 13.
185. See Garcia-Moreno et al., supra note 179, at 1-2; see also Matter of R-A-, 22 I.
& N. Dec. 906, 908 (B.I.A. 1999) (en banc) (concerning violent physical and sexual
abuse).
186. Garcia-Moreno et al., supra note 179, at 1-2.
187. See, e.g., Lirio-Biscocho v. INS, No. 95-70820, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 8654, at
*4 (9th Cir. Apr. 24, 1997) (reasoning that the harm inflicted upon the petitioner, namely
one threat to hit her with a belt and one slap, did not amount to persecution).
188. Matter of Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 222 (B.I.A. 1985) (interpreting the term
"persecution").
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2. Policy Considerations
In addition to Matter of A-R-C-G-'s impact on domestic violence
victims, further expansion of asylum law under the Board's
groundbreaking decision also implicates important practical, political,
and social policy considerations. Given the Board's lack of clarity with
respect to Matter of A-R-C-G-'s precedential value, many policy
considerations still carry great weight in today's immigration law
discourse. First, Matter ofA-R-C-G- and its progeny may have negative
practical consequences in the country's immigration courts because these
courts are already overburdened with large dockets, few immigration
judges, and increasing numbers of cases each year.
189 Depending on the
prevailing interpretation of Matter of A-R-C-G-'s precedential value, the
decision could permit domestic violence victims to argue forcefully in
favor of relief and recognition of particular social groups beyond the
precise social group at issue in that decision.
1 90
Still, this argument presupposes that most international domestic
violence victims will be able to satisfy all the requirements necessary to
construct cognizable social groups. As illustrated by the convoluted and
complex history of the many requirements necessary for such
constructions, this burden of proof is difficult to carry, making the
"floodgates" theory seemingly implausible. Even with an expanded
social group interpretation that would provide a foundation for similar
domestic violence-related claims, applicants must still satisfy the high
standards for constructing particular social groups, which alone will filter
out many potential applicants.19' Moreover, without an attorney, an
asylum applicant is unlikely to know of these complex requirements,
much less meet the burden of demonstrating that these requirements are
present in his or her case and warrant asylum as a matter of discretion.192
Consequently, the fear that more asylum claims may be brought in an
already overburdened United States immigration system is valid, yet
other considerations alleviate these practical concerns.
189. See Luis Arias, Fixing the EOIR: our immigration courts are desperately
overburdened, 21 MICH. J. RACE & L., http://mjrl.org/2015/10/30/fixing-the-eoir-our-
immigration-courts-are-desperately-overburdened/ ("[T]he country's 58 immigration
courts currently have about 445,000 cases in their backlog.").
190. Recent Adjudication, supra note 5, at 2096-97.
191. See Matter of W-G-R-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 208, 213-16 (B.I.A. 2014); Matter of
Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 233 (explaining that the applicant must prove the proposed
social group is: (1) comprised of individual members who share a common immutable
characteristic, (2) defined with particularity, and (3) socially distinct within the society in
question).
192. Nicholas R. Bednar, Note, Social Group Semantics: The Evidentiary
Requirements of "Particularity" and "Social Distinction" in Pro Se Asylum
Adjudications, 100 MINN. L. REV. 355, 362-63 (2015).
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Second, Matter of A-R-C-G- may cause adverse political
consequences by granting asylum relief to social groups without
subjecting these individuals to the yearly quotas imposed in alternative
immigration relief options, including family and employment-based
preference groups as well as various immigrant and nonimmigrant
visas.93 In current immigration reform discourse, there is a point of
contention between preserving national security and providing protection
for asylum-seekers and refugees.19 4 One solution to this concern would
be to simply implement a cap for "particular social group" claims.195
However, it is important to note that asylum is a discretionary form of
relief.196 An asylum applicant may meet his or her burden of proof and
burden of persuasion for establishing refugee status, including the
complex requirements for a cognizable social group, yet may be denied
relief by an immigration judge as a matter of discretion.19 7  This
discretionary component guards against mass migration as the
adjudicator retains the authority to deny asylum based on adverse factors
or simply "as a matter of discretion."'9 '
In any event, additional action signifying that the United States
considers international victims of domestic violence to be deserving of
protection could greatly influence social policy throughout the country.
When humanitarian concern envelopes individuals suffering egregious
persecution, like the persecution suffered by the applicants in Matter of
R-A- and Matter of A-R-C-G-, courts should aim to protect these
international domestic violence victims.199 As such, the best solution in
accordance with the purposes of United States asylum law and policy is
for the Board to expand its interpretation of a cognizable "particular
193. STEPHEN LEGOMSKY & CRISTINA RODRIGUEZ, IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE LAW
AND POLICY 260-77 (Foundation Press, 6th ed. 2015).
194. Michael Cutler,i Political Asylum: How America's Compassion Creates National
Security Nightmares, DAILY CALLER (Feb. 25, 2015), http://dailycaller.com/2015/02/25/
political-asylum-how-americas-compassion-creates-national-security-nightmares/
("America has traditionally been a place of refuge for the downtrodden of the world.
That was the message in Emma Lazarus' famous poem fastened to the base of the Statue
of Liberty, and serves as the basis for our beliefs as Americans.").
195. Benjamin H. Harville, Ensuring Protection or Opening Floodgates?: Refugee
Law and its Application to Those Fleeing Drug Violence in Mexico, 27 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J.
135, 184 (2012) ("Congress has responded to floodgates concerns in the past by placing a
yearly cap on the amount of asylum seekers admitted under certain asylum provisions
contained in the statute.").
196. See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(A) (2012) (providing that the Attorney General "may
grant asylum").
197. Matter of Acosta, 19 1. & N. Dec. 211, 230 (B.I.A. 1985).
198. Id. at 230-31.
199. See Matter of A-R-C-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 388, 389 (B.I.A. 2014) (involving
weekly beatings and rape); Matter of R-A-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 906, 908 (B.I.A. 1999) (en
banc) (concerning violent physical and sexual abuse).
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social group" with respect to domestic violence beyond the facts of
Matter of A-R-C-G-. This "particular social group" construction should
encompass domestic violence victims of other nationalities, genders,
marital statuses, and similar domestic abuse situations that can meet the
high burden of proof required.
IV. CONCLUSION
Because asylum and refugee law was enacted in the United States as
a social policy to assist and protect deserving refugees, our immigration
system should provide international domestic violence victims with
asylum relief when their country is either unable or unwilling to protect
them and the victims meet the high burden of proof required in
constructing a cognizable social group. "[M]arried women in Guatemala
who are unable to leave their relationships" should not be the only
international domestic violence victims that America protects within the
meaning of the term "particular social group" provided in the Act. In
accordance with international humanitarian obligations, American
compassion for domestic violence victims should not be confined.
An analysis of legislative and administrative history, the evolution
of cognizable "particular social group" requirements, and policy
concerns weigh in favor of a broad interpretation of Matter of A-R-C-
G-'s precedential value in future domestic violence-related social group
cases. For an international domestic violence victim, forced to seek
another country's protection from egregious abuse at the hands of a
former lover, this reading of the decision's precedential value is essential
to his or her ability to construct a cognizable social group as a vehicle for
potential asylum relief. While other forms of immigration relief exist, it
is less likely that such a victim would qualify. Therefore, it is imperative
that adjudicators throughout the United States read the Board's decision
in Matter of A-R-C-G- as encompassing claims by future domestic
violence victims of other nationalities, genders, marital statuses, and
involving similar domestic abuse situations.
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